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Abstract—Recent advances in machine learning, especially
techniques such as deep neural networks, are enabling a range of
emerging applications. One such example is autonomous driving,
which often relies on deep learning for perception. However, deep
learning-based perception has been shown to be vulnerable to a
host of subtle adversarial manipulations of images. Nevertheless,
the vast majority of such demonstrations focus on perception that
is disembodied from end-to-end control. We present novel end-
to-end attacks on autonomous driving in simulation, using simple
physically realizable attacks: the painting of black lines on the
road. These attacks target deep neural network models for end-
to-end autonomous driving control. A systematic investigation
shows that such attacks are easy to engineer, and we describe
scenarios (e.g., right turns) in which they are highly effective. We
define several objective functions that quantify the success of an
attack and develop techniques based on Bayesian Optimization to
efficiently traverse the search space of higher dimensional attacks.
Additionally, we define a novel class of hijacking attacks, where
painted lines on the road cause the driverless car to follow a target
path. Through the use of network deconvolution, we provide
insights into the successful attacks, which appear to work by
mimicking activations of entirely different scenarios. Our code
is available on https://github.com/xz-group/AdverseDrive
Index Terms—machine learning, adversarial examples, au-
tonomous driving, end-to-end learning, bayesian optimization
I. INTRODUCTION
With billions of dollars being pumped into autonomous
vehicle research to reach Level 5 Autonomy, where vehicles
will not require human intervention, safety has become a
critical issue [3]. Remarkable advances in deep learning,
in turn, suggest such approaches as natural candidates for
integration into autonomous control. One way to use deep
learning in autonomous driving control is in an end-to-end
(e2e) fashion, where learned models directly translate percep-
tual inputs into control decisions, such as the vehicle’s steering
angle. Indeed, recent work demonstrated such approaches to
be remarkably successful, particularly when learned to imitate
human drivers [4].
Despite the success of deep learning in enabling greater
autonomy, a number of parallel efforts also have exhibited
concerning fragility of deep learning approaches to small
adversarial perturbations of inputs such as images [5], [6].
Moreover, such perturbations have been shown to effectively
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Fig. 1. (a) Existing attacks on machine learning models in the image [1]
and the physical domain [2]; (b) conceptual illustration of potential physical
attacks in the end-to-end driving domain studied in our work.
translate to physically realizable attacks on deep models, such
as placing stickers on stop signs to cause miscategorization of
these as speed limit signs [2]. Fig. 1(a) offers several canonical
illustrations.
There is, however, a crucial missing aspect of most adver-
sarial example attacks to date: manipulations of the physical
environment that have a demonstrable physical impact (e.g., a
crash). For example, typical attacks consider only prediction
error as an outcome measure and focus either on a static image,
or a fixed set of views, without consideration of the dynamics
of closed-loop autonomous control. To bridge this gap, our aim
is to study end-to-end adversarial examples. We require such
adversarial examples to: 1) modify the physical environment,
2) be simple to implement, 3) appear unsuspicious, and 4) have
a physical impact, such as causing an infraction (lane violation
or collision). The existing attacks that introduce carefully
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engineered manipulations fail the simplicity criterion [5], [7],
whereas the simpler physical attacks, such as stickers on a
stop sign, are evaluated solely on prediction accuracy [2].
The particular class of attacks we systematically study is
the painting of black lines on the road, as shown in Fig. 1(b).
These are unsuspicious since they are semantically incon-
sequential (few human drivers would be confused) and are
similar to common imperfections observed in the real world,
such as skid marks or construction markers. Furthermore, we
demonstrate a systematic approach for designing such attacks
so as to maximize a series of objective functions, and demon-
strate actual physical impact (lane violations and crashes)
over a variety of scenarios, in the context of end-to-end deep
learning-based controllers in the CARLA autonomous driving
simulator [8].
We consider scenarios where correct behavior involves
turning right, left, and driving straight. Surprisingly, we find
that right turns are by far the riskiest, meaning that the right
scenario is the easiest to attack; on the other hand, as expected,
going straight is comparatively robust to our class of attacks.
We use network deconvolution to explore the reasons behind
successful attacks. Here, our findings suggest that one of
the causes of controller failure is partially mistaking painted
lines on the road for a curb or barrier common during left-
turn scenarios, thereby causing the vehicle to steer sharply
left when it would otherwise turn right. By increasing the
dimensionality of our attack space and using a more efficient
Bayesian optimization strategy, we are able to find successful
attacks even for cases where the driving agent needs to go
straight. Our final contribution is a demonstration of novel
hijacking attacks, where painting black lines on the road causes
the car to follow a target path, even when it is quite different
from the correct route (e.g., causing the car to turn left instead
of right).
This paper is an extension our previous work [9], with the
key additions of new objective functions, a new optimization
strategy, Bayesian Optimization, and a new type of adversary
in the form of hijacking self-driving models. In this paper, we
first talk about relevant prior work on deep neural networks,
adversarial machine learning in the context of autonomous
vehicles, in Section II. Then in Section III we define the
problem statement and present several objective functions that
mathematically represent the problem statement. In Section
IV, we introduce some optimization strategies. In Section V,
we discuss our experimental setup including our adversary
generation library and simulation pipeline. Section VI shows
how we were able to successfully generate adversaries against
e2e models, and presents a new form of attack, dubbed the
hijacking attack where we control the route of the e2e model.
II. RELATED WORK
A. Deep Neural Networks for Perception and Control
Neural Networks (NN) are machine learning models that
consist of multiple layers of neurons, where each neuron
implements a simple function (such as a sigmoid function),
and where the output is a prediction. Deep Neural Networks
(DNNs) are neural networks with more than two layers of
neurons, and have come to be the state-of-the-art approach for
a host of problems in perception, such as image classification
and semantic segmentation [10]. Despite having complete
autonomous driving stacks which include trained DNN models
for perception, a series of real-world crashes involving au-
tonomous vehicles demonstrate the stakes, and some of the
existing limitations of the technology [11], [12].
B. End-to-end Deep Learning
End-to-end (e2e) learning models are comprised of DNNs
that accept raw input parameters in one end and directly
calculate the desired output at the other end. Rather than
explicitly decomposing a complex problem into its constituent
parts and solving them separately, e2e models directly generate
the output from the inputs. It is achieved by applying gradient-
based learning to the system as a whole. Recently, e2e models
have been shown to have good performance in the domain of
autonomous vehicles, where the forward facing camera input
can be directly translated to control (steer, throttle and brake)
commands [13]–[16].
C. Attacks on Deep Learning for Perception and Control
Adversarial examples (also called attacks, and adversaries)
[5], [17]–[19] are deliberately calculated perturbations to the
input which result in an error in the output from a trained
DNN model. The idea of using adversarial examples against
static image classification models demonstrated that DNNs are
highly susceptible to carefully designed pixel-level adversarial
perturbations [5], [7], [20]. More recently, adversarial example
attacks have been implemented in the physical domain [2],
[6], [21], such as adding stickers to a stop sign that result
in misclassification [2]. However, these attacks still focus on
perception models disembodied from the target application,
such as autonomous driving, and few efforts study such attacks
deployed directly on dynamical systems, such as autonomous
driving [22], [23].
III. MODELING FRAMEWORK
In this paper, we focus on exploring the influence of a
physical adversary that successfully subverts RGB camera-
based e2e driving models. We define physical adversarial
examples as attacks that are physically realizable in the real
world. For example, deliberately painted shapes on the road or
on stop signs would be classified as physically realizable. Fig.
1(b) displays the conceptual view of such an attack involving
painting black lines. We define our adversarial examples as
patterns. To create an adversarial example that forces the e2e
model to crash the vehicle, we need to choose the parameters
of pattern’s shape that maximize the objective functions that
we present. This may cause the vehicle to veer into the wrong
lane or go offroad, which we characterize as a successful
attack. Conventional gradient-based attack techniques are not
directly applicable, since we need to run simulations (using
the CARLA autonomous driving simulator) both to implement
an attack pattern, and to evaluate the end-to-end autonomous
driving agent’s performance.
At the high level, our goal is to paint a pattern (such as a
black line) somewhere on the road to cause a crash. We formal-
ize such attacks in terms of optimizing an objective function
that measures the success of the attack pattern at causing
driving infractions. Since driving infractions themselves are
difficult to optimize because of discontinuity in the objective
(infraction either occurs, or not), one of our goals it to identify
a high-quality proxy objective. Moreover, since the problem
is dynamic, we must consider the impact of the object we
paint on the road over a sequence of frames that capture the
road, along with this pattern, as the vehicle moves towards
and, eventually, over the modified road segment. Crucially,
we modify the road itself, which is subsequently captured
in vision, digitized, and used as input into the e2e model’s
controller.
To formalize, we now introduce some notation. Let δ refer
to the pattern painted on the road, and let l denote the position
on the road where we place the pattern. We use L to denote
the set of feasible locations at which we can position the
adversarial pattern δ, and S the set of possible patterns (along
with associated modifications; in our case, we consider either
a single black line, or a pair of black lines, with modifications
involving, for example, the distance between the lines, and
their rotation angles). Let al be the state of the road at position
l, and al + δ then becomes the state of the road at this same
position when the pattern δ is added to it. The state of the road
at position l is captured by the vehicle’s vision system when it
comes into view; we denote the frame at which this location
initially comes into view by Fl, and let ∆ be the number
of frames over which the road in position l is visible to the
vehicle’s vision system. Given the road state al at position
l, the digital view of it in frame F is denoted by IF (al) or
simply IF . Finally, we let θF = gsa(IF ) denote the predicted
steering angle given observed digital image corresponding to
frame F . With this formalism established, we introduce several
candidates for a proxy objective function that would quantify
the success of an attack.
A. Candidate Objective Functions
1) Steering Angle Summations: First, we denote the vector
of predicted steering angles during an episode with an attack
δ starting from frame Fl to frame Fl+∆ as:
~Θδ = [θFl , θFl+1 , · · · , θFl+∆ ] (1)
We define two objective functions as:
Collide Right : max
l,δ
∆∑
i=0
~Θδi (2a)
Collide Left : min
l,δ
∆∑
i=0
~Θδi (2b)
subject to : l ∈ L, δ ∈ S. (2c)
Equation 2a says that to optimize an attack that causes the
vehicle to veer off towards the right and collide, we need
to maximize the sum of steering angles for that particular
experiment for the frames in which the pattern is in view. And
similarly in Equation 2b, we need to minimize the steering
sum, to make the vehicle veer left. We convert Equation 2b to
a maximization problem for consistency in our search proce-
dures that we will describe. Using Equation 2 as the objective
function allows us to have control over which direction we
would like the car to crash. The following two metrics, the
absolute steering angle difference and path deviation, lose this
ability to distinguish direction-based attacks, since they are
essentially L-1 and L-2 norms.
2) Absolute Steering Angle Differences: Again, let’s denote
the predicted steering angles with an attack δ over the frames
Fl to Fl+∆ as ~Θδ as shown in Equation 1. Now, let’s denote
the predicted steering angles without any attack over the same
frames as ~Θbaseline. This represents an episode where no attack
is added to the road (we refer to this as the baseline run) and
the car travels the intended path with minimal infractions. We
can now define our second candidate metric as:
max
l,δ
||~Θδ − ~Θbaseline||1 (3a)
subject to : l ∈ L, δ ∈ S. (3b)
Equation 3a optimizes an attack over the frames ∆ that cause
the largest absolute deviation in predicted steering angles with
respect to the predicted steering angles when no pattern has
been added to the road.
3) Path Deviation: First denote the (x, y) position of the
agent from frames Fl to Fl+∆ with an attack δ as:
~pδ = [(xl, yl), (xl+1, yl+1), · · · , (xl+∆, yl+∆)] (4)
Define ~pbaseline as the position of the agent with no attack added
to the road over the same frames (the baseline run). We can
optimize the path deviation from the baseline path:
max
l,δ
||~pδ − ~pbaseline||2 (5a)
subject to : l ∈ L, δ ∈ S. (5b)
Similar to Equation 3a, we can use this metric to optimize
deviation from the baseline route, except we are now attacking
the position of the vehicle which is directly influenced by the
outputs of the e2e models.
IV. APPROACHES FOR GENERATING ADVERSARIES
We now describe our approaches for computing adversarial
patterns or, equivalently, optimizing the objective functions
defined above.
A. Random and Grid Search
Each pattern we generate (labeled earlier as δ) can be
described by a set of parameters such as length, width, and
rotation angle with respect to the road. Two naive methods
of finding successful attacks would be to generate a pattern
through either a random or grid search (using a coarse grid)
and evaluate this pattern using one of the above objective
functions. Algorithm 1 shows this setup. The function Run-
Scenario() runs the simulation and returns data such as vehi-
cle speed, predicted acceleration, GPS position, and steering
angle. We use these results to calculate one of the objective
functions (CalculateObjectiveFunction()). As our goal is to
maximize this metric, we use MetricsList to store the results
of the objective function at each iteration. Finally, we return
the parameters that maximized our objective function.
Algorithm 1 Adversary Search Algorithm
Require: Strategy ∈ Random, Grid
i← 0
MetricsList← [ ]
loop
δi ← GenerateAttack(Strategy)
results ← RunScenario(δi)
yi ← CalculateObjectiveFunction(results)
MetricsList.append(yi)
i← i+ 1
end loop
return arg max MetricsList
B. Bayesian Optimization Search Policy
Algorithm 1 works well when the number of parameters
for δ are relatively small. For a larger pattern space, and
to enable us to explore the space more finely, we turn to
Bayesian Optimization, which is designed for optimizing an
objective function that is expensive to query without requiring
gradient information [24]. It has been shown that Bayesian Op-
timization (BayesOpt) can be useful for optimizing expensive
functions in various domains such as hyper-parameter tuning,
reinforcement learning, and sensor calibration [25]–[28]. In
our case, since we use an autonomous driving simulator, it is
expensive to run a simulation with a generated attack in order
to find, for example, the sum of steering angles as shown in
Equation (2). On average, one episode takes between 20 to
40 seconds depending upon the scenario; consequently, it is
important for the optimization to be sample efficient.
-At the high level, our goal is to generate physical adver-
saries that successfully attack e2e autonomous driving models,
where a successful attack can be quantified as trying to
maximize some objective function f(δ). Our goal, therefore,
is to find a physical attack, δ∗, such that:
δ∗ = arg max
δ
f(δ), (6)
where δ∗ ∈ Rd and d is the number of parameters of the
physical attack. We first assume that the objective f can
be represented by a Gaussian Process, which we denote by
GP (f, µ(δ), k(δ, δ′)) with a mean function of µ(δ) and a
covariance function k(δ, δ′) [29]. We assume the prior mean
function to be µ(δ) = 0 and the covariance function to be the
Mate´rn 5/2 kernel:
k(δ, δ′) =
(
1 +
√
5r
`
+
5r2
3`2
)
exp
(
−
√
5r
`
)
, (7)
where r is the Euclidean distance between the two input
points, ||δ − δ′||2, and ` is a scaling factor optimized during
simulation run-time. Let’s suppose that we have already gener-
ated several adversaries and evaluated our objective function
f for each of these adversaries. We can denote this dataset
as D = {(δ1, y1), · · · , (δn−1, yn−1)}. Therefore, if we would
like to sample our function f at some point along the input
space δ, we would obtain some posterior mean value µf |D(δ)
along with a posterior confidence or standard deviation value
of σf |D(δ). As noted earlier, our objective function f is
expensive to query. When we use Bayesian optimization to
find the parameters that define our next adversary δn, we
instead maximize a proxy function known as the acquisition
function, u(δ). Compared to the objective function, it is trivial
to maximize the acquisition function using an optimizer such
as the L-BFGS-B algorithm with a number of restarts to
avoid local minima. In our case, we utilize the Expected
Improvement (EI) acquisition function. Given our dataset, D,
we first let ymax be the highest objective function value we
have seen so far. The EI can be evaluated at some point δ as:
u(δ) = E[max(0, f(δ)− ymax)]. (8)
Given the properties of a Gaussian Process, this can be written
in closed form as follows:
z =
µf |D(δ)− ymax
σf |D(δ)
; (9)
u(δ) = (µf |D(δ)− ymax)Φ (z) + σf |D(δ)φ (z) , (10)
where Φ and φ are the cumulative and probability distribution
functions of the Gaussian distribution. Effectively, the first
term in the above acquisition function leads to exploiting
information from previously generated adversaries to generate
parameters for δn while the second term prefers exploring
the input space of the adversary parameters. Given this setup,
Algorithm 2 presents a Bayesian Optimization approach for
generating and searching for adversarial patterns. In this
Algorithm 2 Bayesian Adversary Search Algorithm
i← 0
MetricsList← [ ]
loop
δi ← arg maxu(δ)
results ← RunScenario(δi)
yi ← CalculateObjectiveFunction(results)
MetricsList.append(yi)
Update Gaussian Process and D with (δi, yi)
i← i+ 1
end loop
return arg max MetricsList
algorithm, the Gaussian process is updated in each iteration,
and the acquisition function reflects those changes. An initial
warm-up phase where the adversary parameters are chosen at
random and the simulation is queried for the objective function
is used for hyper parameter tuning.
V. EXPERIMENTAL METHODOLOGY
This section introduces the various building blocks that we
use to perform our experiments. Fig. 2 shows the overall
architecture of our experimentation method, including the
CARLA simulator block, the python client block, and how
they communicate with each other to generate and test the
attack patterns on the simulator.
A. Autonomous Vehicle Simulator
Autonomous driving simulators are often used to test
autonomous vehicles for the sake of efficiency and safety
[30]–[33]. After testing popular autonomous simulators [34]–
[37], we chose to run our experiments on the CARLA [8]
(CAR Learning to Act) autonomous vehicle simulator, due to
its feature-set and ease of source code modification . With
Unreal Engine 4 [38] as its backend, CARLA has sufficient
flexibility to create realistic simulated environments, with a
robust physics engine, lifelike lighting, 3D objects including
roads, buildings, traffic signs, vehicles and pedestrians. Fig. 2
shows how the simulator looks in the third person view. It
allows us to acquire sensor data like the camera image for each
frame (camera view), vehicle measurements (speed, throttle,
steering angle and brake) and other environmental metrics like
how the vehicle interacts with the environment in the form
of infractions and collisions. Since we use e2e models that
use only the RGB camera, we disable the LiDAR, semantic
segmentation, and depth cameras. Steering angle, throttle and
brake parameters are the primary control parameters to drive
the vehicle in the simulation. CARLA (v0.8.2) comes with two
maps: a large training map and a smaller testing map which
are used for training and testing the e2e models respectively.
CARLA also allows the user to run experiments under various
weather conditions like sunset, overcast and rain, which are
determined by the client input. To keep consistent frame rate
and execution time, we run CARLA using a fixed time-step.
B. End-to-end Driving Models
The CARLA simulator comes with two trained end-to-
end models: Conditional Imitation Learning (IL) [39] and
Reinforcement Learning (RL) [8]. Their commonality ends at
using the camera image as the input to produce output controls
that include steering angle, acceleration, and brake. The IL
model uses a trained network which consists of demonstrations
of human driving on the simulator. In other words, the IL
model tries to mimic the actions of the expert from whom
it was trained [40]. The IL model’s structure comprises of
a conditional, branched neural architecture model where the
conditional part is a high-level command given by the CARLA
simulator at each frame. This high-level command can be left,
right or straight at an intersection, and lane follow when not
at an intersection.
At each frame, the image, current speed, and high-level
command are used as inputs to the branched IL network to
directly output the controls of the vehicle. Therefore, each
branch is allocated a sub-task within the driving problem
(making a decision to cross an intersection or following the
TABLE I
Different types of attacks and their respective parameters and constraints.
var - variable, const - constant, NA - Not Applicable
Attack Type
params Single Line Double Line Two Lines N-Lines
# lines 1 2 2 N
position var var var var
rotation var var var var
length const const const var
width const const const var
gap NA var NA NA
color const const const var
opacity const const const var
dimensions 2 3 4 N * 6
current lane). The RL model uses a trained deep network based
on a rewards system, provided by the environment based on
the corresponding actions, without the aid of human drivers.
More specifically, for RL, the asynchronous advantage actor-
critic (A3C) algorithm was used. It is worth mentioning that
the IL model performed better than the RL model in untrained
(test) scenarios [8]. Because of this, we focus our research
primarily on attacking the IL model.
C. Physical Adversary Generation
1) Unreal Engine: To generate physically realizable adver-
saries in a systematic manner, we modify CARLA’s source
code. The CARLA simulator (v0.8.2) does not allow spawning
of objects into the scene which do not already exist in the
CARLA blueprint library (which includes models of vehicles,
pedestrians, and props). With the Unreal Engine 4 (UE4), we
create a new Adversarial Plane Blueprint, which is a 200×200
pixel plane or canvas with a dynamic UE4 material, which
we can overlay on desired portions of the road. The key
attribute of this blueprint is that it reads a generated attack
image (a .png file) and places it within CARLA in real time.
Hence this blueprint has the ability to continuously read an
image via an HTTP server. The canvas allows the use of
images with an alpha channel which allows attacks which are
partly transparent, like the one shown in Fig. 3. Then, we
clone the two maps that are provided by CARLA and choose
regions of interest within each of them where attacks spawn.
Some interesting regions are at the turns and intersections. We
place the Adversarial Plane Blueprint canvas in each of these
locations. When CARLA runs, an image found on the HTTP
server gets overlaid on each canvas. Finally, we compile and
package this modified version of CARLA. Hence we are able
to place physical attacks within the CARLA simulator.
2) Pattern Generator Library: We built a pattern generator
that creates different kinds of shapes as shown in Fig. 3 using
the pattern parameters (Table I). For the pattern generator, we
explore parameters like the position, width, and rotation of
the line(s). We sweep the position and rotation from 0-200
pixels and 0-180 degrees respectively to generate variations
of attacks. Similarly, we create a more advanced pattern
which involves two parallel black lines called the double-line
pattern as described in Table I. It comprises of the previous
Fig. 2. Architecture overview of our simulation infrastructure including the interfaces between the CARLA simulator and the pattern generator scripts.
Visualization of the camera and the third person views from one attack episode are also shown.
Fig. 3. Attack Generator Capabilities. (a) shows the most basic attack which
is a single line. (b) and (c) show attacks using two lines, but (b) has a constraint
that the lines always need to be parallel, (d) shows the ability of the generator
to generate N number of lines with various shapes and color.
parameters, namely, position, rotation, and width, with the
addition of a new gap parameter which is the distance between
the two parallel lines. Lastly, we remove the parallel constraint
on double lines to increase the search space of the attacks
while preserving simplicity. Fig. 2 shows some examples of
the generated double line patterns which can be seen overlaid
on the road in frames 55 and 70.
Additionally, our library has the ability to read a dictionary
object containing the number of lines, the parameters (position,
rotation, width, length and color) for each line, and produce
a corresponding attack pattern as shown in Fig. 3 (d). Once
the pattern is generated, it is read via the HTTP server and is
placed within the Carla simulator.
3) OpenAI-Gym Environment for Carla: Since CARLA
runs nearly in real-time, experiments take a long time to
run. In order to efficiently run simulations with our desired
parameters, we convert the CARLA setup to an OpenAI-
Gym environment [41]. While the OpenAI-Gym framework
is primarily used for training reinforcement learning models,
we find the format helpful as we are able to easily run the
simulator with a set of initial parameters like the task (straight,
right, left), the map, the scene, the end-to-end model and the
desired output metric (eg. average infraction percent for that
episode). With this set up, we are able to use an optimizer
to generate an attack with a set of defined constraints, run an
episode and get the resulting output metric.
D. Experiment Setup and Parallelism
To ensure a broad scope to test the effectiveness of the
different attacks in various settings, we conduct experiments
by changing various environment parameters like the maps
(training map and testing map), scenes, weather (clear sky,
rain, and sunset), driving scenarios (straight road, right turn,
and left turn), e2e models (IL and RL) and the entire search
space for the patterns. Here, we describe the six available
driving scenarios for CARLA:
1) Right Turn: the agent follows a lane that smoothly turns
90 degrees towards the right.
2) Left Turn: the agent follows a lane that smoothly turns
90 degrees towards the left.
3) Straight Road: the agent follows a straight path.
4) Right Intersection: the agent takes a right turn at an
intersection.
5) Left Intersection: the agent takes a left turn at an
intersection.
6) Straight Intersection: the agent navigates straight
through intersection.
We choose the baseline scenarios (no attack) where the e2e
models drive the vehicle with minimal infractions. We run
the experiments at 10 frames per second (fps) and collect the
following data for each camera frame (a typical experiment
takes between 60 to 100 frames to run): camera image from the
mounted RGB camera, vehicle speed, predicted acceleration,
steering and brake, percentage of vehicle in the wrong lane,
percentage of vehicle on the sidewalk (offroad), GPS position
of the vehicle, and collision intensity. Fig. 2 shows this
Fig. 4. Comparison of the infractions caused by different patterns. (a) Driving
Infraction regions; (b)(c) Infraction percentages for IL; (d)(e) Infraction
percentages for RL; NA - No Attack, SL - Single Line pattern, DL - Double
Lines pattern; Straight - Straight Road Driving, Right - Right Turn Driving,
Left - Left Turn Driving
dataflow which is sufficient to assess the ramifications of a
particular attack in an experiment.
To search the design space thoroughly, we build a CARLA
docker which allows us to run as many as 16 CARLA instances
simultaneously, spread over 8 RTX GPUs [42].
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Through experimentation, we demonstrate the existence of
conspicuous physical adversaries that successfully break the
e2e driving models. These adversaries do not need to be subtle
or sophisticated modifications to the scene. Although they can
be distinguished and ignored by humans drivers with ease,
they effectively cause serious traffic infractions against the e2e
driving models we evaluate.
A. Simple Physical Adversarial Examples
1) Effectiveness of Attacks: To begin, we generated two
types of adversarial patterns: single line (with varying po-
sitions and rotation angles), and double lines (with varying
positions, rotation angles, and distance between the lines).
In Fig. 4(a), we define different safety regions of the road
in ascending order of risk. We start with the vehicle’s own
lane (safe region), the opposite lane (unsafe), offroad/sidewalk
(dangerous) and regions of collisions (very dangerous) past
the offroad region. Fig.4(b)(c)(d)(e) shows that by sweeping
through the three scenarios (straight road driving, right turn
driving, left turn driving) with the single and double line
patterns, for both the training map and testing maps, we see
that some patterns cause infractions. Here we use a naive
grid search approach to traverse the search space with the
Steering Sum optimization metric defined in Equation 2a. First,
we observe the transfer-ability of adversaries since some of
our generated adversarial examples cause both IL (Fig.4(b))
and RL (Fig.4(d)) models to produce infractions. Second,
attacks are more successful against the RL model than the IL
model. Additionally, we notice that the double line adversarial
examples cause more severe infractions than their single line
counterparts. Lastly, we observe that Straight Road Driving
and Left Turn Driving are more resilient to attacks that cause
stronger infractions.
2) Analysis of Attack Objectives: To find the optimal adver-
sary which produce infractions like collisions for the case of
Right Turn Driving scenario, the optimizer has to find a pattern
that maximizes the first candidate objective function: the sum
of steering angles as hypothesized in Equation 2. A positive
steering angle denotes steering towards the right and a negative
steering angle implies steering towards the left. Fig. 5(a)(b)
show the sum of steering angles and the sum of infractions
respectively, for each of the 375 combinations of double line
patterns. The infractions are normalized because collision data
is recorded in SI units of intensity [kg ×m/s], whereas the
lane infractions are in percentages of the vehicle area in the
respective regions. Fig. 5 also shows the three lowest points
(minima) for the steering sum and the three highest points
(maxima) for the collisions plot. In Fig. 5(c), we use the
argmin and argmax on the set of attacks to observe the shapes
of the corresponding adversarial examples for both the steering
sum and infraction results. We observe that the patterns
that minimize the sum of steering angle and correspondingly
maximize the collision intensity are very similar. Thus, the
objective based on maximizing or minimizing steering angles
is clearly yielding valuable information for the underlying
optimization problem. However, this does not mean that it’s the
best objective, among the three choices we considered above.
We explore this issue in greater depth in the next subsection,
as we move towards studying more complex attacks using
Bayesian optimization.
B. Exploration of Large Design Spaces
In Fig. 4, we observe that when we switch from a Single
Line attack (with 2 dimensions) to a Double Line attack (with
3 dimensions), in most cases, there is a significant increase in
the number of successful attacks. It is reasonable to assume
that as we increase the number of degrees of freedom in the
attack, it should be possible to also increase the success rate.
We lend further support to this intuition by considering an
attack called the Two Line attack, shown in Fig. 3(c), with 4
dimensions by removing the constraint that the two lines must
be parallel. As shown in Fig. 4, attack success rates increase
considerably compared to the more restricted attack.
TABLE II
Comparison of Candidate Objective Functions as listed in Section III (in %).
∑
st. angles - sum of steering angles, abs. st. diff. - absolute steering difference
Left Straight Right
Metric safe collision offroad opp. lane safe collision offroad opp. lane safe collision offroad opp. lane∑
st. angles 18.2 0 0 81.8 99 0 0 1 72.2 9.5 13.8 24.5
path deviation 64.6 0 0 35.4 23.8 2.5 2.8 76.2 57.2 24.0 28.3 40.2
abs. st. diff. 0.2 0 0 99.8 22.7 7.5 9.3 77.3 0 95.2 99.2 100
Fig. 5. Adversary against ”Right Turn Driving”. (a) Adversarial examples
significantly changes the steering control. (b) Some patterns cause minor
infractions whereas others cause level 3 infractions. (c) The patterns that cause
the minimum steering sum and maximum collisions look similar.
However, increasing the dimensionality of the attack search
space makes grid search impractical. For example, the Single
Line attack with grid search requires around 375 iterations to
sweep the search space at a 20 pixel resolution. Preserving
the same parameter resolution (or precision) would require
1440 iterations for Double Lines, and 12,960 iterations for
the Two Line attack. Naive search would require around 45
days to sweep through the search space for a single scenario
on a modern GPU. Additionally, using a sparser resolution for
the attack parameters means that we would not find potential
attacks which can only be found at a higher resolution.
We address this issue by adopting the Bayesian Optimiza-
tion framework (BayesOpt) for identifying attack patterns
(introduced in Section IV-B). This requires a change in our
search procedure as shown in Algorithm 2. In short, it uses
the prior history of the probed search space to suggest the next
probing point.
Fig. 6 shows the comparison between the 3 optimization
techniques we employ for the straight, left-turn, and right-turn
scenarios. We see that for all three cases, BayesOpt outper-
forms the naive grid search and the random search methods. In
Fig. 6, BayesOpt uses 400 initial random points to sample the
search space and subsequently samples 600 optimizing points.
Hence, we observe that for the first 400 iterations, BayesOpt
follows closely with random search, and after probing those
initial random points, we observe a significant increase in the
number of successful attacks.
Because we observe many more successful attacks against
the Left and Right Turn scenarios as compared to the Straight
Scenario, Fig. 6 further supports our notion that driving
straight is harder to attack as compared to the right and left
turn scenarios.
Equipped with BayesOpt, we now systematically evaluate
the relative effectiveness of the different objective functions.
Table II shows the infractions caused by each of the objective
functions (path deviation, sum of steering angles, and absolute
difference in steering angles with the baseline). For Left Turn,
Straight Road, and Right Turn Driving, we list the percentage
out of 600 simulation runs using BayesOpt that were safe,
incurred collisions, off road infractions, or opposite lane
infractions. We observe that the absolute difference in steering
angles with respect to the baseline run is the strongest metric
when coupled with BayesOpt to discover unique, successful
attacks. While the most natural metric would seem to be
steering sum, it is in practice considerably less effective than
maximizing absolute difference in the steering angle. The
path deviation objective function performs well in right turn
and straight scenarios, but fails to find optimal attacks in
the left turn driving scenario. Overall it still under-performs
when compared to the absolute steering difference objective
function.
C. Importance of Selecting a Reliable Objective Function
In Section VI-B, we evaluated three different objective
functions: path deviation, sum of steering angles and absolute
steering difference. We observed that the choice of the right
objective function is crucial for success, and this choice is not
necessarily obvious.
Most surprisingly, perhaps, we found that the objective
that uses the steering angles to guide adversarial example
construction is not the best choice, even though it is perhaps
the first that comes to mind, and one used in prior work [32].
We now investigate why this choice of the objective can fail.
Fig. 7 shows three driving scenarios (left turn, driving
straight, and right turn) respectively. Fig. 7(a) shows the paths
taken by the vehicle for 3 cases: a baseline case where there
is no attack, an unsuccessful attack case where an attack
pattern does not cause the e2e model to deviate significantly
from the baseline path, and a successful attack case where
an attack causes a large deviation resulting in an infraction.
Fig. 7(b) shows the sum of steering angles for each of the
corresponding cases in Fig. 7(a). Note that for Left Turn
Driving, we try to maximize Eq. (2a), which is to collide to
the right, and for Straight Driving and Right Turn Driving,
we maximize Eq. (2b), which is to collide to the left. For the
right turn driving scenario, we observe that there is indeed a
large difference between the steering sums for a strong attack
and a weak attack, but in the other two scenarios, we notice
Fig. 6. A comparison of different search algorithms for generating successful attacks. In each driving scenario: Left Turn (a) , Straight Road (b), and Right
Turn (c) Driving, the Bayesian approach not only finds more unique, successful adversaries in the same number of iterations but also finds these attacks at
a faster rate. BayesOpt randomly samples the adversary search space for the first 400 iterations (shown before the dashed line) to tune the hyper-parameters
of the kernel function. After these randomly sampled points, BayesOpt utilizes an acquisition function to sample the search space. While a dense grid search
would eventually find at the least the same number of attacks as BayesOpt, we constrain our experiments to 1000 iterations given our computational resources.
Fig. 7. Paths taken by e2e model in Left Turn, Straight Road, and Right Turn
Driving with no attack (baseline), an unsuccessful attack, and a successful
attack (a). Cumulative sum of steering angles for each scenario (b). While
the successful attack is able to cause the e2e agent to incur an infraction
or collision in each scenario, the steering sum metric is unable to capture
distinguish between the successful and unsuccessful attack in two of the three
scenarios.
that the baseline, unsuccessful attack and successful attack
have very similar steering sums. Hence, the optimizer has
a difficult time distinguishing between an unsuccessful and
successful attack. In straight driving scenario, we see that
the steering sum for a successful attack begins increasing and
then sharply decreases, even though the vehicle has deviated
significantly from the baseline path. This is due to the ability
of the IL e2e model to recover in this case, resulting from
data augmentation at training time where initial position of
the car was randomly perturbed. The sum of steering angles
TABLE III
Success rate of Hijacking Attacks for six scenarios.
Hijack Success Rates % Successful % Unsuccessful
Straight → Right 14.8 85.2
Straight → Left 0.0 100.0
Left → Straight 23.7 76.3
Left → Right 14.3 85.7
Right → Left 1.4 98.6
Right → Straight 25.9 74.1
objective function is unable to capture this behavior. For the
case of left turn driving, we discover that the successful attack
not only causes a change in steering angle, but also a change
in throttle, resulting in the vehicle speeding up and reaching
a position further along the baseline path, which opens up
new possibilities for generating attacks as well as causing new
types of infractions.
The absolute steering difference mitigates the above issues
by summing up the absolute steering differences between the
baseline and attack cases. This allows the objective function
to counteract the recovery ability of the e2e models. However,
we do lose the ability to directly control the direction towards
which we desire the vehicle to crash.
D. Vehicle Hijacking Attacks
Thus far, our exploration of adversarial examples against
autonomous driving models focused on causing the car to
crash, or cause other infractions. We now explore a different
kind of attack: vehicle hijacking. In this attack, the primary
purpose is to stealthily lead the car along a target path of the
adversary’s choice.
When attacking the IL model, previous experiments have
only targeted the Lane Follow branch of this model. Now, we
focus our attacks on three different branches of the IL Model:
Fig. 8. Illustration of a hijack attack where we use an attack to trick the
vehicle to deviate from its normal path (base route) to a target hijack route. It
demonstrates a successful hijack where we make a vehicle otherwise turning
right at an intersection, to turn left.
Right Intersection, Left Intersection, and Straight Intersection.
Here, we define a successful attack to be an adversary that
1) causes no infractions or collisions and 2) causes the agent
to make a turn chosen by the attacker rather than the ground
truth at a particular intersection (e.g. the attacker creates an
adversary to make the agent turn left instead of go straight
through an intersection). With this definition, an attack that
causes the agent to incur an infraction is not considered to
be a successful attack. In order to produce such attacks, we
modify our experimental setup. After choosing a particular
intersection, we run the simulation with no attack to record the
baseline steering angles over the course of the episode. The
high-level command provided by CARLA directs the agent to
take a particular action at that intersection (for example, go
straight). We then modify the CARLA high-level command
to the direction desired by the attacker (for example, take
a right turn). After running the simulation, we store these
target steering angles over the entire episode. Finally, we revert
the CARLA high-level command to the original command
provided to the agent during the baseline simulation run
and begin generating attacks at the intersection. We modify
our optimization problem to minimize the difference in the
steering angles recorded during an episode with an attack (~Θδ
as defined in III-A) and the steering angles of the target run
(defined as ~Θtarget):
min
l,δ
||~Θδ − ~Θtarget||1 (11a)
subject to : l ∈ L, δ ∈ S. (11b)
CARLA (v0.8.2) did not include a four-way intersection
in their provided maps, which constrain our experiments to
a three-way junction as shown in Fig. 8. Of the six possible
hijacking configurations, we were able to generate adversaries
that successfully hijacked the car to take a desired route rather
Fig. 9. (a) Histogram showing strong adversaries. (b) Depiction of range of
rotation, position and gap parameters for the most robust adversaries.
than the baseline route for five configurations. For example,
Fig. 8 shows the car being hijacked to take a right turn instead
of going straight. While we were able to produce attacks that
incurred an infraction in each scenario shown in Fig. 8 (the
gray paths), these episodes did not count as successful hijacks
as the car did not take the target route. Table III shows the rate
of successful attacks for the six available hijacking scenarios
in CARLA v0.8.2. To conclude, we were able to modify our
optimization problem and generate adversaries at intersections
which caused the agent to take a hijacking route, rather than
the intended route.
E. Interpretation of Attacks using DeConvNet
In this section, our goal is to better understand what makes
the attacks effective. We begin by quantitatively analyzing the
range of parameters of attacks that will generate the most
robust attacks in the context of right turns. For simplicity,
we analyze the Double Line attack whose parameters include
rotation angle, position, and gap size. Fig. 9 shows a histogram
of the collision incidence rates versus the pattern IDs, and
its corresponding parameters for an experiment with 375
iterations. Fig. 9(b), in particular, shows that some parameters
play a stronger role than others in generating a successful
attack. For example, in this particular setting Double Line
attacks, successful adversaries have a narrow range of rotation
angles (90 - 115 degrees). Fig. 9(b) also shows that smaller
gap sizes perform slightly better than larger ones.
To better understand the working mechanisms of the suc-
cessful attack to the underlying imitation learning algorithm,
we use network deconvolution, using a state-of-the-art tech-
nique, DeConvNet [43]. Specifically, we attach each CONV
block (a convolution layer with ReLU and a batch normal-
izer) to a DeConv counterpart, since the backbone of the
imitation learning algorithm is a convolutional neural network
which consists of eight CONV blocks for feature extraction
and two fully connected (FC) blocks for regression. Each
Fig. 10. Attacks against Right Turn Driving: The top row shows the camera input while the bottom deconvolution images show that the reconstructed inputs
from the strongest activations determine the steering angle. (a) Right Turn Driving without attack, (b) Right Turn Driving with attack and (c) Left Turn Driving
without attack for comparison
DeConv block uses the same filters, batch norm parameters,
and activation functions as the CONV block, except that the
operations are reversed. In this paper, DeConvNet is used
merely as a probe to the already trained imitation learning
network: it provides a continuous path to map high-level
feature maps down to the input image. To interpret the net-
work, the imitation learning network first processes the input
image and computes the feature maps throughout the network
layers. To view selected activations in the feature maps of a
layer, other activations are set to zero, and the feature maps
backtrack through the rectification, reverse-batch norm, and
transpose layers. Then, activations that contribute to the chosen
activations in the lower layer are reconstructed. The process
is repeated until the input pixel space is reached. Finally, the
input pixels which give rise to the activations are visualized.
In this experiment, we chose the top-200 strongest/largest
activations in the fifth convolution layer and mapped these
activations down to the input pixel space for visualization.
The reasons behind this choice are twofold: 1) The strongest
activations stand out and dominate the decision-making in NNs
and the top-200 activations are sufficient to cover the important
activations, and 2) activations of the fifth CONV layer are
more representative than other layers, since going deeper
would mean that the amount of non-zero activations reduces
significantly, which invalidates the deconvolution operations,
while shallow layers fail to fully capture the relation between
different extracted features.
We conduct a case study to understand why an attack works.
Specifically, we take a deeper look inside the imitation network
when adversaries are attacking the autonomous driving model
for the right turn driving scenario. The baseline case without
any attack is depicted in Fig. 10(a) while the one with a
successful double-line attack is shown in Fig. 10(b). In the
first row of Fig.10, the input images from the front camera
mounted on the vehicle are displayed, which are fed to the
imitation learning network. In Fig. 10(a), the imitation learning
network guides the vehicle to turn right at the corner, as
the steering angle output is set to a positive value (steering
+0.58). The highlighted green regions in the reconstructed
inputs in the corresponding second row show the imitation
network makes this steering decision mainly following the
curve of the double yellow line. However, when deliberate
attack patterns are painted on the road as shown in Fig. 10(b),
the imitation network fails to perceive the painted lines which
could be easily ignored by a human; instead, the network
regards the lines as physical barriers and guides the vehicle to
steer left (steering -0.18) to avoid a fictitious collision, leading
to an actual collision. The reconstructed image below confirms
that the most outstanding features are the painted adversaries
instead of the central double yellow lines. We speculate that
the vehicle recognizes the adversaries as the road curb. And
Fig. 10(c) confirms our speculations. In this case, the vehicle is
turning left and the corresponding reconstructed image shows
the curb would contribute the strongest activations in the
network which will make the steering angle a negative value
(steering -0.24) to turn left. The similarity of the reconstructed
inputs between cases (b) and (c) suggests that the painted
attacks are misrecognized as a curb which leads to an unwise
driving decision. To summarize, the deliberate adversaries that
mimic important road features are very likely to be able to
successfully attack the imitation learning algorithm. This also
emphasizes the importance of taking more diverse training
samples into consideration when designing autonomous driv-
ing techniques. Note that since the imitation learning network
makes driving decisions solely based on current camera input,
using one frame per case for visualization is enough to unravel
the root causes of an attack’s success.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we develop a versatile modeling framework
and simulation infrastructure to study adversarial examples on
e2e autonomous driving models. Our model and simulation
framework can be applied beyond the scope of this paper,
providing useful tools for future research to expose latent flaws
in current models with the ultimate goal of improving them.
Through comprehensive experiment results, we demonstrate
that simple physical adversarial examples that are easily realiz-
able, such as mono-colored single-line and multi-line patterns,
not only exist, but can be quite effective under certain driving
scenarios, even for models that perform robustly without any
attacks. We demonstrate that Bayesian Optimization coupled
with a strong objective function is an effective approach to
generating devastating adversarial examples. We also show
that by modifying the objective function, we are able to hijack
a vehicle where we cause the driverless car to deviate from
its original route to a route chosen by an attacker. Finally, our
analysis using the DeConvNet method offers critical insights
to further explore attack generation and defense mechanisms.
Our code repository is available at:
https://github.com/xz-group/AdverseDrive.
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